Unanswered Questions about the contract with Aquarion
The process for this privatization is severely flawed, and this flawed process
may result in deeply flawed decision-making.
? Full and open competitionTo make a rational and sound economic decision
requires full and open competition, and a clear alternatives that provide
leverage for the city to get the best deal. The City has not prepared an
alternative cost estimate for operating the waste water treatment plant itself
and addressing CSOs. Aquarion knows that. The City has limited leverage
in these negotiations.
? Basis for decision making is flawedThe consultants hired by the Mayor
took the least efficient operations as a baseline cost, which appears to be
inflated, and used it to justify a potential 6% savings over 20 years. The
Special Legislation does not provide for the City to use this method for
decision making.
? Consultant lacks credibilityOne of the consultants hired by the City,
Malcom Pirnie and Associates, was severely criticized by the Inspector
General for overstating savings to the city of Lynn from a 20 year design
build contract. Why was a firm with tainted credibility hired by Holyoke to
evaluate this proposal?
? City Council Needs Assistance--The City Council will need to hire its own
consultants to assist it in evaluating this 700 page contract and the
alternatives available to the city.
? The City Should Follow State Policy as the Basis for Decision Making--
The Pacheco-Menard Act (MGL Ch 7, Sec 52-55) is the state policy which
guides privatization decisions by state agencies. It requires competition and
a comparison using the most efficient public agency approach versus bids
solicited from the private sector. This 10 year old law has guided numerous
privatization decisions, including one at the Holyoke Community College.
This same methodology should be applied here because it will produce a
more reasoned decision than the approach used by the consultants. They
have created illusory savings by setting up a straw man that can be readily
knocked down.
? Alternative City Proposals Non Existent--When the City Council asked for
the Water Department to prepare an alternative, the mayor ridiculed the
Water Department. The Mayor should explain why the DPW has not be
required to prepare a competitive proposal for municipal operations.
? Mayor¹s Special Legislation Strips City Council AuthorityWhen the
Mayor proposed Special Legislation to the City Council to allow a 20 year
design build contract, he sold it as a way to gather market based information
on privatization alternatives, and assured us that this legislation would not
prejudge the outcome. Nor would it affect the Council¹s authorities to
approve or deny a contract. After the legislation was enacted, the City
Solicitor opined that this Special Legislation stripped the City Council of its
authority to vote up or down on this particular contract. All other contracts
longer than 3 years require city council approval.
? Earlier this year, the City Council passed a Home Rule Petition to reinstate
its authorities to approve or deny this contract by a 14-1 margin, but the
Mayor refused to sign it and send it to Boston. The Mayor has offered no
explanation. However, it would be fair to ask the Mayor why he didn¹t
declare up front that the City Council was losing its authorities under the
Special legislation. The Mayor should be asked why he opposed
reinstatement of the checks and balances provided by the City Council. The
Inspector General made a number of recommendation in the aftermath of the
fisaco with the City of Lynn 20 year DBO contract. However, removing city
council authorities was not recommended by the Inspector General. The
Mayor should explain who drafted this Special Legislation for him.
? By stripping the City Council of its authorities, rate payers have lost an
essential voice in the decision making process.
? Reserve Fund is a Company Funded Cookie Jar--The Aquarion contract
contains a $1 million Reserve Fund to ³be funded and maintained by the
Company for the benefit of the City to pay certain costs in connection with
this Service Contract at the sole discretion of the city, all as more
particularly described therein.² The Reserve Fund Agreement does not
describe the purpose of this fund, except to restate the previous sentence.
? Authority to Approve Rate IncreasesAlthough the City Council lost its
authority to approve the contract, the City Council has been repeatedly
assured by the Mayor and the Council President that the Council retains its
authority to approve this contract by reviewing and approving sewer rate
increases.
? Contract Award--I have reviewed this contract, and I find no provision
which conditions the commencement of this contract on appropriations or a
sewer rate increase. The Mayor needs to clarify the question we have raised
over and over: What happens if the Council does not approve the sewer
rate increase? Will the contract we awarded or not?
? Mayor May Seek to Use Other FundsIf a rate increase is not approved, the
Mayor may seek to use other appropriated funds, or the Reserve Fund to
initiate operations of the Aquarion contract. This legally questionable
approach could allow the Mayor to circumvent the need for City Council
approvals in the short term, and could allow the contract to commence.
? Consequences of Default--However, additional funds will eventually be
required to feed Aquarion, if the sewer rate increase is not approved. This
could involve requests for transfers of Free Cash or Rainy Day Funds to
cover the costs of the Aquarion contract or a renewed request for rate
increase. If such appropriations are not granted, the City would be unable to
pay the service fees required under the contract. Under the Aquarion
contract, the city would then be in default, and liable for a liquidated
damages fee of 5% of the cumulative value of the Aquarion Service Fee over 20 years.
? The Mayor should provide an estimate of this default cost assuming default
incurs during the first 5 years. My best estimate is $7 million, but given that
there are 4 pages of algebraic formulas to calculate the liquidated damages,
this estimate could be low.
? Possible Blackmail--Faced with a $5-7 million default judgement, the city
council may be coerced into approving funding for the privatization
contract.
? Ratepayers should be alerted that the potential for this sequence of events exists real.
--Since EPA is not putting any money into covering the costs of this unfunded
mandate, they have no standing to rattle a sabre at a poor community like Holyoke.